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INTRODUCTION

[T]his much I think I do know-that a society so riven that
the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a
society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that
in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting
upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the
end will perish.'
The conduct of litigation within the tort system in late 20th
century America evinces little spirit of moderation. The tort
claim stands beside apple pie as an American institution. Persons involved in auto accidents are known to seek legal advice
before seeing their doctor. Lawyers arrive on the scene of major disasters within hours of their occurrence. When an airliner crashes, the class action suit is on file before the wreckage
t Partner and defense trial practice lawyer at the Minneapolis law firm of Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A. Mr. Cole received his J.D. from Georgetown
Law Center in 1964 and is admitted to practice in Maryland and Minnesota. He is a
member of the Minnesota State Bar Association, the American Bar Association, and
the International Association of Insurance Counsel. He is currently active in the Civil
Litigation section of the Minnesota State Bar Association. Mr. Cole is a frequent
speaker at various Minnesota Continuing Legal Education and Minnesota Defense
Lawyers seminars.
Previous to becoming a lawyer at Lommen, Nelson, Mr. Cole was a trial lawyer for
the United States Marine Corps and Counsel for the Committee on Economic Matters for the Maryland House of Delegates. He has also been Chairman of the Committee on Negligence and Insurance law of the Minnesota State Bar Association, the
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1. I. DILLIARD, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155-65, 164 (3d Ed. 1960).
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is cleared. Virtually every enterprise except, notably, that of
the judiciary itself, is affected by the spectre of expensive litigation and exposure to ruinous liability for misjudgment or misadventure-real or rhetorical. We are a litigious society, and
tort reform is the platform of the reactionaries. They have
struck a responsive chord.
This Article will discuss the basis for dissatisfaction with the
tort system, the problems identified, the reforms proposed using Minnesota as an example, and the author's proposal to create two tiers of civil litigation.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF DISSATISFACTION

Many states have passed some legislation designed to moderate tort exposure; Minnesota is among them. The political
impetus for this reform is easy to underestimate. The Minnesota House of Representatives in 1986 passed its tort reform
measure unanimously! Its bill was considerably broader than
the ultimate enactment-calling for a cap on pain and suffering
and the abolition ofjoint liability. On the national scene, Minnesota is not perceived to have had a particularly bad experience with abusive verdicts. California, on the other hand, is
perceived as the birthplace of every zany theory of liability advanced in the past twenty years. This perception is perhaps
only slightly exaggerated, but the California voters declared
their verdict recently. In a 1986 referendum, over two-thirds
of the voters turning out threw out the venerable doctrine of
joint liability among joint tortfeasors. It seems incredible indeed that the doctrine ofjoint liability should stand beside taxation and public education as popular political issues in
California. Thus, tort doctrine, once the exclusive domain of
Professor Prosser and his legions of students now inhabiting
the bench and bar, has come to the fore of American domestic
politics.
The intensity of the current tort reform advocacy is the
product of a fortuitous confluence of events. For the past several years, increasing publicity has attended tort litigation.
From the story of the man who sued because he suffered a
heart attack while starting his lawnmower to the spectre of
American lawyers flocking to India to sign up clients in the
Bhopal disaster, the average American has garnered reason
enough to question the social and moral values underlying the
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/4
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tort system as it now functions. This perception was ignited by
the huge increases in liability insurance premiums experienced
in the last two years, an event rooted more in the return to a
stable currency than in the tort verdict experience. Nonetheless, the tort process was seen not only as silly and degrading
but was costing everyone a lot of money in premiums and in
the cost of products and services. After all, if a Manhattan obstetrician pays an annual premium of $85,000 to insure against
professional liability, the doctor has to recoup that cost in his
charges to patients. Criticism of the tort system has been wideranging, but the theme is relatively constant. The legal profession-bench and bar-operates a franchise for the transfer of
wealth attended by huge transaction costs and little predictability either in respect of liability or damages. The results are
a product of chance more than principle. This theme has an
element of truth to it.
Although lip service is paid to the doctrine of stare decisis, the
rules are sufficiently vague and the purview of the jury in determining outcome is so broad that the results cannot often be
rationalized on principle. The complexity of the issues entrusted to juries in contemporary litigation perhaps marks the
most profound alteration in the tort system within the past
twenty-five years. Thejury's role in resolving fact issues is paramount in civil litigation. A jury is certainly well equipped to
resolve the question of whether a witness lied or a defendant
exceeded the speed limit. In recent years, however, the evolution in torts has created "fact" issues of a different sort. Juries
now resolve questions of whether a machine's design is free of
defect, whether a surgeon's technique is reasonable, and numerous issues similarly beyond the ken of a cross-section of
ordinary citizens. Modern tort litigation is, then, clearly dependent upon expert witnesses. There is usually no dearth of
willing experts on a given issue. The results in these cases are
rarely instructive. The manufacturer's duty to warn of foreseeable hazards in the use of its products exemplifies this
problem.
Almost all product liability claims include an allegation that
the manufacturer failed to properly warn or instruct the user
concerning the safe operation or use of the device. Hardly any
product sold in the last fifteen years has not been plastered
with repetitious and often obvious declarations of hazard.
Nonetheless, the adequacy of the precise content of the warnPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
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ing is ajury question in most cases. Thus, in Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. ,2 the court upheld a jury verdict finding a warning
inadequate on a forage harvester. The plaintiff farmer had lost
his arm while attempting to unclog the forager without shutting off the power.3 Warnings were in place that warned
against this practice as dangerous and unsafe and instructed
the operator to turn the power off before reaching in to unclog. 4 The jury found the warning inadequate, and the court
affirmed that finding as proper because the warning had not
stated specifically that the machine could entrap the limb
before the operator could react to extract it. 5 It is apparent
that if the generic warnings of the manufacturer are assessed in
light of each specific accident, the warning can be found wanting in light of the elements of the accident under inspection.
The fact is that the jury can react in whatever way it chooses in
these cases and will probably be affirmed. In Parks, for example, it is clear that if the jury had approved the warning, it
would have been affirmed. A manufacturer is justifiably frustrated in defending these cases. No manner of prudent warning will save the machine manufacturer from litigation and a
certain percentage of unsuccessful verdicts. This dilemma has,
in some cases, notably the punch press, driven companies out
of business.
The ad hoc aspect of the tort exposure probably produces its
greatest abuse in the stimulation of numerous marginal claims.
The essence of the plaintiff attorney's prospective analysis is
whether the claim can be sufficiently enhanced by argument or
expert testimony to avoid a directed verdict and be submitted
to a jury. If so, the case is suitable for filing. In this respect,
much tort litigation is perceived as high stakes and sophisticated gambling.
Defenders of the current process, most notably the plaintiff
lawyer groups, argue that the system is an essential instrument
of social justice, citing most frequently the products liability
arena as the most visible example. While it cannot be denied
that trials have, on occasion, identified corporate wrongdoing
or immorality, these are certainly exceptional cases. The ques2.
3.
4.
5.

289 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1979).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459.
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tion remains whether the entire apparatus must be preserved
without alteration because of its occasional vindications.
II.

THE PROBLEM AREAS

The problem areas in the tort system upon which the reform
proposals focus, as taken from the Report of the Tort Policy
Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications
of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, are:
-the movement towards no-fault liability, which increasingly results in companies and individuals being found liable even in the absence of any wrongdoing on their part;
-the undermining of causation through a variety of questionable practices and doctrines which shift liability to
"deep pocket" defendants even though they did not cause
the underlying injury or had only a limited or tangential
involvement;
-the explosive growth in the damages awarded in tort lawsuits, particularly with regard to non-economic awards such
as pain and suffering or punitive damages; and,
-the excessive transaction costs of the tort system, in
which virtually two-thirds of every dollar paid out through
6
the system is lost to attorneys' fees and litigation expenses.
The principle that one who wrongfully injures another
should compensate the injured party for his loss has virtually
unanimous acceptance in American society not only as a principle of law but as an instinct ofjustice. The tort system exists
primarily to adjudicate these controversies and determine
compensation. In recent time, the notion of liability has been
separated from the principle of fault. In its place, the courts
have made social and economic policy judgments focused on
just means of spreading the risk of injuries independent of
fault. Strict liability in products manufacture and distribution
is a prime example. Market share liability is another. The cost
of such a system managed through the courts is probably too
high. The compensation of these victims may not be an issue
for judicial management.
The awards of damages for personal injury in some areas has
6. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AF-

FORDABILITY p. 2 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office: 1986-510:40090). The Working Group
was appointed by the U.S. Attorney General to study the tort system.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

certainly increased. Jury Verdict Research, Inc. reports that
average malpractice jury verdicts increased from $220,018 in
1975 to $1,017,716 in 1985, and the average product liability
verdict increased from $393,580 in 1975 to $1,850,452 in
1985. 7 This upward trend is undoubtedly evident in other areas such as accountant and lawyer professional liability. There
is no data, however, to suggest a disproportionate increase in
verdicts attached to auto accidents or the other garden variety
torts. The implication that there may be a two-tiered verdict
system was confirmed in the preliminary observations of a
Rand Corporation study finding that jurors in Cook County,
Chicago, tended to award three times as much to an injured
worker than to an automobile accident victim with similar
injuries.8
The awarding of damages in a personal injury case is left
virtually to the discretion of the jury, bound only by a vague
directive categorizing the permissible elements of the ultimate
award, i.e., pain, suffering, emotional distress, loss of earning
capacity, etc. The jury is traditionally given no guidelines in
fixing the amount of the award. Two claimants with virtually
identical injuries can and often will receive widely disparate
awards. This unpredictability is perhaps a greater vice than the
occasional clearly excessive award.
Transaction costs are certainly high. A tremendous amount
of litigation takes place in relation to the claims actually paid.
The litigation process is inherently expensive. In a tort system
more reliant on advocacy skills than any other ingredient for
resolution, it is inevitable that great expense will attend the
resolution of disputes. The large sums of money at stake also
dictate the commitment of substantial resources to the controversies. Claimants pay their lawyers contingent fees of onethird to one-half of the award for their services. Thus, it is
obvious that, in a hard fought dispute, the injured claimant will
receive far less than one-half of the funds committed to the
controversy by the time it is resolved. It is also true that, in the
great number of cases where the claimant fails to recover, the
7. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., INJURY VALUATION: CURRENT AWARD TRENDS
No. 304 (1986). The 1985 data is incomplete.
8. THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVILJUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST FIVE PROGRAM
YEARS, APRIL 1980 - MARCH 1985 p. 26 (1986).
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defendant has incurred great expense and has no remedy for
reimbursement.
It is difficult to describe the transaction costs in gross as excessive. These costs are exactly what is demanded by the tort
process. If these costs are to be reduced, the number of cases
must be reduced. Reducing transaction costs is dependent
upon reform in the substantive law serving to eliminate categories of claims, e.g., no-fault laws, workers compensation, or
upon revisions in civil procedure that discourage the prosecution of dubious claims or eliminate the intensity of pre-trial
discovery.
III.

THE EFFICACY OF REFORMS - THE MINNESOTA EXAMPLE

The 1986 Minnesota legislature enacted a host of measures
under the label "tort reform." Some of these provisions accomplished needed changes in the process. None of the
changes were passed with expectation of insurance premium
reductions. The tone of the reforms, however, declares that
the bench and bar must dignify the system by reducing the litigation of dubious claims.
The discretion of the court to sanction lawyers for the assertion of frivolous claims and defenses was increased.9 Lawyers
filing medical malpractice claims must certify that they have expert witness support for the claims.' 0 Lawyers may not include
a claim for punitive damages unless the court approves the
claim on a motion to amend."1 The latter measure was passed
to counter a growing trend to allege punitive damages routinely as a means of broadening the scope of discovery. It is
evident from these measures that the legislature concluded
that lawyers, and to some extent courts, were not adequately
policing the quality of claims being asserted. The legislature
demands greater scrutiny of the claim by the lawyer and the
judge at the outset. The success of these measures ultimately
depends upon the response of the trial bench. If it is perceived
that nothing more than the forms of civil pleading have been
changed, the reforms will fail. If the courts require, however,
that cases be commenced with at least prima fade evidence in
support, the institution of meritless litigation should be re9. MINN. STAT. § 549.21 (1986).
10. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (1986).

11.

MINN. STAT.

§ 549.191 (1986).
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duced. The early summary judgment2 should no longer be
viewed as a tool to be used sparingly.'
Minnesota enacted a unique measure fixing the discount rate
annually for future damage computations including pain and
suffering.' 3 This measure requires the court to use the same
discount rate, ignoring inflation, in calculating future damages
in all personal injury cases. 14 The aim of the law is to introduce greater certainty into the calculation of future damages
and to obviate the need for economist experts on interest rates
and inflation. The measure is definitely addressed to the issue
of high, unpredictable damage awards and transaction costs.
Minnesota also abolished the collateral source rule on dam15
ages incurred to the date of trial.
A measure to abolish joint liability failed in Minnesota.
Some adjustment in this rule is called for in light of the
adoption of comparative negligence. Joint liability among tortfeasors is a traditional rule in Minnesota. Its rationale was
stronger, however, under a contributory negligence system
where the recovering plaintiff was innocent of fault. In requiring one of several tortfeasors to discharge the entire liability in
preference to depriving an innocent party of full compensation, the courts were striking a reasonable balance. If the
plaintiff was negligent at all, he would bear the whole loss.
Under comparative fault, however, a negligent plaintiff can recover. Joint liability should not be enforceable in any case
where the plaintiff bears a measure of fault. In such cases, all
parties should be liable for their individual share alone.
Minnesota's reforms are aimed at discouraging the filing of
marginal claims. As a priority, courts are expected to demonstrate a willingness to dismiss cases in advance of discovery unless some evidence is produced to support the claim. If these
measures fail, the next round of "reforms" may start to divest
the courts of their discretion. The elements of tort liability and
damage awards will become less dependent on the rulings of
judges and more on the prescriptions of statutes. Other states,
notably Florida and California, have already begun the process
12. Cf. International Union of Operating Engrs. v. Krejec, 366 N.W.2d 388
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
13.

MINN. STAT. § 604.07 (1986).

14. Id. at subd. 3.
15. MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (1986).
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of divesting the courts of their prime rulemaking role in tort
cases.
IV.

A

PROPOSAL - THE MINOR AND MAJOR CASE
DIFFERENTIAL

The American court system is unique in its accessibility to
the citizen. For a nominal fee, litigation costing the state and
the parties tens of thousands of dollars can be initiated with
virtually no risk to the initiating party to pay either his own or
his opponent's extraordinary costs. The contingent fee system
has enhanced this accessibility by making skilled legal representation available at no risk and little cost. The plaintiff's
lawyer assumes the risk and spreads it among a large base of
clients by charging a high contingent rate. Thus, an active
plaintiff's lawyer can afford to pursue several unsuccessful
claims for every actual recovery. This accessibility has great
benefits, but it also produces abuse and an abundance of
avoidable litigation. Outside of the contingent fee system, the
expense of litigation discourages many marginal claims. A
similar deterrent should be introduced into contingent fee litigation, at least where significant damage claims are presented.
Tort cases may arbitrarily be divided into minor and major
cases. The litigant may perceive a claim as major and force an
active and expensive discovery effort and trial unwarranted by
the actual stakes. Personal injury claims frequently represent
an exaggerated litigation effort in relation to the ultimate outcome. The unpredictability of result induces both sides to promote seemingly minor cases into major litigation efforts.
There should be some risk attached to this promotion. In securities fraud cases or commercial litigation, the damage opportunity or exposure is patently simpler to assess. Damages
in these cases, or at least their relative magnitude, can be well
understood by arithmetic calculation. The jury does not have
great latitude in measuring the loss. In the personal injury
contest, however, the jury has enormous discretion. One jury
may award $10,000 for an injury that might draw $100,000
from another panel. This uncertainty often leads the parties to
an extensive litigation effort that, in hindsight, might seem unwarranted. A system that increases the risk as well as the reward for promoting expensive litigation could serve to induce
a more realistic appraisal of the case at its outset.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
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The distinction between minor and major cases in the civil
justice arena should be formalized in the rules of procedure.
In "minor cases" the litigants would be significantly restricted
in the conduct of discovery and in the time allotted for trial.
Statutory costs and disbursements should be taxable as currently allowed-filing fees, expert fees, and witness fees.
These are nominal costs in relation to the cost of the litigation
effort itself. Damages would be restricted to $100,000 or less.
The plaintiff would make the initial election to proceed as a
"minor case." The emphasis would be upon minimal discovery and rapid resolution with comparatively low cost handling.
In a "major case," however, the parties would proceed in the
manner currently practiced in the District Courts-virtually
unrestricted discovery, pre-trial conferences, and lengthy trials. There would be no limit on damages. In major cases,
however, the losing party would have to indemnify the winner
for up to $30,000 in attorneys' fees plus actual costs. The
party seeking major case designation would be required to
post bond for the costs and fees. The cost of the bond would
be a taxable cost. Success in the litigation would be defined in
such a manner as to permit the parties to use the offer ofjudgment process to reduce their exposure.
A claimant who seeks to root around in the business files of
his adversary for days, depose countless employees, and otherwise require the commitment of substantial time and resources
to the dispute would be forced, at least in part, to indemnify
his opponent if it is all for naught. After all, the tort system
itself is built upon principles of compensation and individual
responsibility entirely consistent with the notion that one who
requires another to spend thousands of dollars defending an
unproven claim (or prosecuting a meritorious claim), should
reimburse the opponent. The right to sue, hallowed as it is in
the American culture, is not degraded by such a modest attachment of responsibility. Possibly, such a process would significantly contribute to a reduction in transaction costs, a result
that would achieve meaningful reform and not at the expense
of the rightful claimant.
CONCLUSION

A tort system for the adjustment of wrongs and the vindication of rights in private controversies is essential to a free demhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/4
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ocratic society. The preservation of such a system requires
that we maintain vigilance against its use as a vehicle for
nitpicking grievances or a political instrument for the transfer
of wealth. It was intended to be neither.
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